Foreign Influence

AFFECTED PERSONS

The “Foreign Influence” criterion (Guideline B) under the “National Security Adjudicative Guidelines” affects many security clearance applicants, particularly those who are naturalized U.S. citizens or whose parents immigrated to the U.S. Others who marry (or reside with) a foreign national, who have foreign financial/business interests, or who maintain close and continuing contact with foreigners are also affected. There is another related criterion—Foreign Preference—that sometimes affect these same applicants.

SECURITY CONCERN

Foreign Influence has been a significant concern when considering people for security clearances. This has been due in part to changes in people who have chosen to spy against the U.S. A government study (PERSEREC TR08-05: Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947-2007) issued in March 2008 reported that since 1990 offenders who are naturalized citizens rose to 35%, those with relatives or close friends overseas increased to 58%, and those with foreign business or professional connections increased to 50%.

The Adjudicative Guidelines specify that:

Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to business, financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance. They may also be a national security concern if they create circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with U.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Assessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which the foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to considerations such as whether it is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

EVALUATING FOREIGN INFLUENCE

The location, relationship, occupation, activities, and interests of the foreign person, as well as the recency, frequency and nature of the contact are all relevant. The monetary value of foreign financial and business interests are also relevant. The security significance of these foreign contacts and interests can be measure by value of foreign financial interests as a percentage of an applicant’s total net worth and the extent to which an applicant:

• Maintains contact with foreign friends, family members, or professional associates.
• Provides or receives material support to/from contacts outside the U.S.
• Travels to the country where the contacts are located.
• Maintains property or financial interests (including inheritance rights) outside the U.S.
• Reports association with foreigners when required.

Foreign connections that “create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, government, or country by providing that information” are security concerns. Absent a potential for a conflict of interest, foreign connections must present a “heightened” risk of foreign influence to be a security concern. A heightened risk can be created either by the nature of the foreign contact or by the applicant’s perceived/presumed susceptibility to foreign influence.  Circumstances or behavior that could attract the attention of foreign intelligence can also heighten the risk of undue foreign influence.  The country involved does not have to be hostile to the U.S. in order for a heightened risk to exist.

MITIGATING FOREIGN INFLUENCE

In assessing an applicant’s ability to resist foreign influence adjudicators may consider the degree to which an applicant has assimilated American culture and displayed attachment and undivided loyalty to the United States by:

• Applying for U.S. citizenship as soon as they are eligible.
• Expressing their intention to live permanently in the U.S. even after retirement.
• Observing American holidays.
• Participating in local non-ethnic social, community, political, or charitable groups.
• Socializing with people outside their ethnic group.

Most people are not willing to sever communications with a close family member in a foreign country or dispossess themselves of significant foreign financial interests. But if the family member or financial interest is located in a country like China or Russia, severing such ties may be the only effective way to mitigate foreign influence concerns. In recent years the level of espionage directed against the United States by China and Russia has increased dramatically. It doesn’t matter that the increased threat is primarily from technical collection methods and active measures—particularly cyberwarfare—rather than the traditional recruitment of spies. Since 1980 there have been virtually no published cases of foreign intelligence services targeting U.S. citizens with foreign relatives to obtain protected information through the use of pressure or coercion. Nevertheless, U.S. Government agencies continue to deny security clearances based on the potential for foreign exploitation of Americans with foreign relatives.

INTERIM CLEARANCES

Interim clearances are problematic when any security issue exists. The existence of close foreign connections can create a presumption of foreign influence. Often this issue can be mitigated by the information collected during a security clearance investigation. But interim clearances require issue mitigation before the investigation is completed. The Questionnaire for National Security Positions (Standard Form 86—SF86) asks about foreign activities, associates, financial interests, and travel. But the SF86 does not ask for information that might mitigate indicators of foreign influence. Applicants are allowed to include mitigating information in their SF86 (or the electronic version known as e-QIP) by using the “Continuation Space” at the end of the paper version or by using the “Add Optional Comment” text fields following each question on the e-QIP version. Including mitigating information in this manner is often a determining factor in the granting of an interim clearance.

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY CLEARANCES

For first- and second-generation immigrants, employment with the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is often out of reach. This is because the disqualifying condition created by the existence of non-U.S. citizen immediate family members is more difficult to mitigate for access eligibility to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) than for collateral (non-SCI) clearances.  SCI access eligibility is almost always a requirement for IC employment.  When certain countries are involved, this obstacle can only be overcome with a “waiver” from a Senior Official of the Intelligence Community.  Over ten years ago the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) repeatedly stressed the need to break down the IC security clearance and employment barriers for first- and second-generation immigrants.  In testimony before congress on security clearance reform in February 2008 the Assistant Deputy DNI for Security stated:

“Additionally modifications to IC hiring policies are being made to allow for the hiring of first and second generation, or heritage, American candidates. . . . We fully expect the near-term outcome of this DNI-level policy change to result in more applications from heritage Americans and ultimately a more robust mission capability within the IC.”

The DNI has had the authority to change policy for SCI access throughout the IC. But IC members are resistant to change and change cannot be affected by fiat alone. Executive Order 13467, as part of a major clearance reform effort, expanded the DNI’s authority to change the standards for all federal security clearances. But little has changed in the risk avoidance policies of the IC despite the critical need for people with special knowledge of foreign languages and cultures.

By William H. Henderson

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